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PERJURED TESTIMONY: ITS EFFECT ON CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
THE extent to which perjured testimony effectively denies to a de-
fendant the fair trial guaraxiteed to him by the fourteenth amendment
was, until recently, apparently well established by the rule of Mooney
v. Holahan.1 There it was held that a new trial was constitutionally
required where conviction had been obtained by the presentation of testi-
mony known to the prosecution authorities to have been perjured.2
While the language of subsequent decisions purporting to follow this
rule has remained deceptively similar,' and an express confinement of
the definition of the term "prosecution authorities" has been noticeably
absent, the rule has, nevertheless, undergone subtle, unarticulated
changes.
That this revision has gone unnoticed by most courts and, therefore,
resulted in unnecessary confusion is aptly illustrated by the recent case
of Curran v. State.4 There, a high ranking police officer, without the
knowledge of the prosecuting attorneys, perjured himself in contra-
dicting the defendants' testimony. The Supreme Court of Delaware
held that the defendants were not thereby deprived of a fair trial and
interpreted the Mooney rule to require that perjury, in order to consti-
tute a denial of due process, must be "brought home to the prosecuting
1 94 U.S. 103 (1935).
A second and complementary rule followed in many jurisdictions affords a de-
fendant a new trial where the reviewing court is reasonably certain that testimony
of a material witness is false; that, without it, the jury might have reached a different
conclusion; that the defendant was taken by surprise with the false testimony and was
unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial. See, for example,
Larrison v. United States, 24 F.zd 8, 87 (1928). Reference to this rule, although
it is not based upon constitutional principles, is necessary to portray adequately the
picture with regard to injurious perjured testimony and to place the rule of Mooney
v. Holohan in its proper perspective.
'While this rule is attributed to Mooney v. Holohan, in reality it has grown from
a principle announced in that case as mere dictum. Although the language of that
dictum was broad, the fact the allegations accused the prosecutor, individually, of sur-
pressing important evidence is the basis for the formulation of the rule.
* Use of the same words in formulating the rule without further explanation has
created situations in which it is virtually impossible to detect substantive changes which
may have existed in the minds of some judges. Yet, recent cases indicate that behind
this facade of repetition changes must have transpired.
a49 Del. 587, 122 A.zd xz6 (x956).
officer." 5  Defendants successfully petitioned the federal district court
for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that such perjury constituted
a "fundamental unfairness in the trial of a criminal case."' This de-
cision, unique in that it marks the first time a court has explained, with-
out equivocation, that the Mooney rule extends to state agents other
than the prosecuting attorneys, suggests that a close reappraisal of that
doctrine is necessary.
Fundamental to the application of the Mooney rule is the advertent
use of material perjured testimony by state authorities. For only in this
manner is the defendant deprived, by state action, of his constitutional
right to a fair trial. It is not clear, however, why most courts have
restricted application of Mooney v. Holahan to a single type of state
agent, the prosecuting attorney.7 Apparently, this result flows in large
measure from the fact that a vast majority of the cases has involved
knowledge of perjury by this official and, consequently, has permitted
-even encouraged-a mechanical application of the rule.' This maze of
a 49 Del. 587, 595, z2.2 A.2d 126, 130 (z956).
a 154- F. Supp. 27, 31 (D. Del. 957).
'See, for example: White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (x945) New York ex rel.
Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U.S. 688 (1943); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219
(x94x)5 Taylor v. United States, 221 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1955); United States
ex rel. House v. Swope, 219 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. i9ss) ; Ryles v. United States, 198
F.zd 199 (zoth Cr. 1952); Story v. Burford, 178 F.2d 9"z (ioth Cir. 1949); James
v. United States, 175 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1949) ; United States ex. rel. Rooney v.
Ragen, 173 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. x948); Cobb v. United States, x61 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.
1947); Wagner v. Hunter, 161 F.2d 6oi (zoth Cir. 1947); Casebeer v. Hudspeth, 1zz
F.zd 914 (oth Cir. 1941) ; United States ex rel. Bevilacqua v. Reincke, 147 F. Supp.
933 (D. Conn. z956) ; United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ;
Hubbard v. Jacques, 95 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Mich. 195i); Kowalak v Frisbie, 93
F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Mich. 1950); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F.
Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949); Wilhoit v. Hiatt, 6o F. Supp. 664 (M.D. Pa. 1945);
People ex rel. Albanese v. Hunt, 34 F. Supp. 444 (W.D.N.Y. 1939); Hurt v. State,
312 P.2d z69 (Okla. Crim. 1957); Commonwealth ex. rel. Cobb v. Burke, 176 Pa.
Super. 6o, 107 A.2d 207. (1954); Aronson v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 599, x21
N.E.zd 669 (1954); Smyth v. Godwin, 188 Va. 753, 51 S.E.2d 230 (1949); People
v. Whitman, 56 N.Y.S.2d 89o (1945); Dolan v. State, 195 Miss. 154, 13 So.2d 925
(1943) ; Ex parte Wallace, 24 Cal.2d 933, 152 P.2d 1 (944).
It will be noted that many of the cases cited herein involve federal as well as state
action. Although the scope of this note is limited to state action, the federal action
cases are pertinent authority in that they are often cited inerchangeably with state action
cases by the courts.
" Since the Mooney rule requires that the prosecution authorities know that per-
jured testimony was used against the defendant, those defendants asserting it generally
allege participation by the prosecutor. The result is a process confusingly circuitous
in that the more typical the case the more firmly entrenched becomes the rule, and
as the rule becomes less flexible so the case arising under it becomes more stereotyped.
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stereotyped cases may, in turn, have induced many other courts, faced
with situations involving other state officials, to ignore the broader
ramifications of the rule.
. Some courts, however, have not felt constrained to accept a narrow
interpretation of the Mooney rule, and, by expanding the meaning of
the word "prosecution" or by rejecting its limiting implication com-
pletely, those courts have, construed the rule to embrace state agents
other than prosecuting attorneys.9 The first of these cases was Pyle v.
Kansas' where the uncontroverted allegations made no mention of the
prosecuting attorney's knowledge but stated that the "... afflant was
forced to give perjured testimony... by local authorities ... and the
Kansas State Police... ." The Supreme Court of the United States
applied the Mooney doctrine to condemn this action. While a num-
ber of courts, subsequently faced with the stereotyped"1 fact situation,
have cited the Pyle decision, or have aligned themselves with the reason-
ing therein, in support of their conclusions,2 there is some question as to
'In ex'parte Lindey, .29 Cal.;d 709, 177 P.2d 9z8, 926 (1947) it is significant
that no reference to the terms "prosecutor" or "prosecution" is made, the majority of
the court sating that where conviction is obtained "... by perjured testimony know-
ingly presented by representatives, of the State, (the defendant) is entitled to a judg-
ment discharging him from custody and the suppression by the State of material evi-
dence will be considered in connection with such a charge." Three concurring justices
preferred limiting the rule to responsible relirestptatives of the state. In In re De La
Roi, 28 Cal.2d 264, 1x69 P.2d 363, 366, 367, 370 (z946) whereas the court spoke
of "prosecuting officials," it also used the broader terms, "representative of the state of
California" and- "any officer or officers." Note also the progression in the following
seven Maryland cases beginning with Reeder v. Warden, 196 Md. 683, 77 A.zd ,
(195o) in which the court seemed purposely to avoid using the words "prosecution" or
£pro6ecutor."1 To the same effect are Johns v. Warden, 205 Md. 644, ioB A.zd 9oo
(1954) .qnd State ex rel. Billman v. Warden, 197 Md. 683, 79 A.2d 540 (1951),
the latter court saying, "There is no charge that any state officer or employee had any
part in procuring such perjury . . . or knew that the testimony was perjured." But in
Madison v. State, 2o5 Md. 425, to9 A.2d 96 (1954), typical fact situations, the
courts reverted' to such orthodox language as "prosecution," 'prosecuting authorities,"
and "prosecuting attorney." However, in view of the fact that these cases relied on
the earlier broader cases and that the subsequent cases of Barker v. Warden, 2o8 Md.
662, 119 A.2d 710 (x956), Brigmon v. Warden, 2T3 Md. 628, I3 A.2d 245 (957)
and M6Cutheon v. Warden, 138 A.2d 369 (Md. 1958) returned to more liberal
language ("state's officers"), it can be said that these seven decisions reflect an extension
of the Moorey rule.
See also Jones . Commonwealth, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938), which seemingly
set forth a rule broader than any before or since the Mooney case.
10 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
' That is to say, cases in which the alleged evil concerns the prosecuting attorney
as opposed to any other governmental official.,.
I "Lister v. McLeod, 240 F.2d 1.6 (soth Cir. 1957); Bales v. Larrison, 244. F.2d
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whether these courts have adopted that decision in its broadest aspects
or whether they are blind to other than its most salient implications.
13
Other cases, too, have contained language that appears to depart from
the narrow construction of the Mooney rule but which may, in riality,
rather have been intended only as a slightly different wording of the
same general rule.14
495 (8th Cir. 9.57) ; United States v. Rutkin, ±12 F.2d 641 ( 3 6 Cir. 1954) 5 United
States ex. rel. O'Connell v. Ragen, 212 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 954s)5 United States v.
Spadafora, 200 F.2d 14o ( 7th Cir. 1952) 5 United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, igs
F.2d 8z5 ( 3 d Cir. 19S2)5 United States v. Rosenberg, io8 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y.
X952); Brigmon v. Warden, 213 Md. 35, x31 A.2d 245 (1957); Edwards v. People, 76
S.Ct. io58 (1956) 5 State v. Eaton, 280 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1955); France v. Warden,
"oS Md. 636, 1o9 A.2d 65 (1954); Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 1o9 A.2d 96
(954); Johns v. Warden, 205 Md. 644, io8 A.2d 906 (1954); State ex rel. Billman
v. Warden, 197 Md. 683, 79 A.2d 540 (595i); Reeder v. Warden, 196 Md. 683, 77
A.2d x (1950); Townsend v. Hudspeth, 167 Kan. 366, 205 P.zd 483 (1949i)5 Burke v.
State, 2o Ga. 656, 54 S.E.2d 350 (1949); Pyle v. Amrine, 159 Kan. 458, x56 P.zd
509 (1945) ; Bx parte Burns, 247 Ala. 98, .22 So.2d 517 (1945) ; Morhous v. Supreme
Court of New York, 293 N.Y. 131, 56 N.E.2d 79 (x944) ; Anderson v. Buchanan, 292
Ky. Sio, x68 S.W.2d 48 (x943).
Exemplary of such a misconception is Pyle v. Amrine, 1.59 Kan. 45P8,. 56 P.2d
509, 515 (1945), the follow-up case to Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). There
the Kansas court interpreted. Pyle v. Kansas to mean that "in order to constitute grounda
for release on a w~it of habeas corpus it must appear that the officers in charge of the
prosecution knew it to be false." If any ambiguity remained after that decision it
vanished when, four years later, the same Kansas court cited Pyle v. Amrine to stand
for the proposition that the prosecutor must know of the perjury. Townsend v.
Hudspeth, 167 Kan. 366, 205 P.2d 483 (1949). Thus, if Pyle v. Kansas had extended
the rule it went unnoticed by the very court directly affected by it.
"In Hysler v. Florida, 35 U.S. 411 (1942) the United States Supreme Court
said, "... if Florida, through her responsible officials knowingly used false testi-
mony . . . extorted from a witness 'by violence and torture' . . . [then] convicted
[defendant] may claim protection of the Due Process Clause. . ' Id. at 413. And
while this appears to extend the Mooney rule, the implication is that the majority meant
the prosecuting attorney. In addition, the dissent stated, "I do not, however, regard this
as a proper occasion to determine whether the rule of Mooney v. Holohan applies
only where guilty knowledge is that of 'the prosecuting officer' and not any other
responsible official." Id. at 423. Other cases present similar ambiguities: "neither the
United States nor any of its officers," and, "prosecuting authorities," United States v.
Jakalski, 237 F.2d 503, 504, 505 ( 7th Cir. 1956); "prosecuting attorney or anyone
else connected with the Government," Owens v. Hunter, 169 F.2d 971, 972 (oth Cir.
1948) ; "officials connected with trial in the state court," Tompsett v. State, 146 F.2d
95, 99 (6th Cir. 1944) ; "state," "prosecuting authorities," "prosecuting attorneys,"
Petition of Sawyer, 129 F. Supp. 687, 696 (D. Wis. 1955) ; "false testimony . . . used
by the State at the trial with knowledge that it was perjured testimony," Caldwell v.
State, 36 Ala. 6x2, 63 SO.2d 384, 385 (1952) 5 Ex parte Gammon, 255 Ala. 502, 52
SO.2d 369 (x9sx); "the agencies of the state for the enforcement of law and admin-
istration of justice... ," Skipper v. Schumacher, 124 Fla. 384, x69 So. 58, 64 (1936).
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Nevertheless, the customary narrow construction of Mooney v.
Holahan is apparently relaxing, and new limitations will, of necessity,
have to be formulated. A workable solution might be to expand the
meaning of the term "prosecution authorities" to include all employees
of the state directly connected with bringing a particular defendant to
justice, rather than to disturb the langpage of the general rule. This
would permit judicial flexibility and would more nearly afford the de-
fendant the protection against prejudicial state action, to which he is
constitutionally entitled.
